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EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY  
 
 
 
Several key points are made in this study:  
 
§ A decisive move toward Montenegrin independence in the 
near term will result in a war between Serbian and 
Montenegrin forces.  
 
§ A move toward Montenegrin independence would cause 
Serbian public opinion to focus inward and would likely be 
the first step in the process towards true democratic 
evolution.  
 
§ Russia is not likely to support Montenegrin independence.  
 
§ Russia is unlikely to take decisive action to save the Yugoslav 
Federation.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
erbia and Montenegro each, with the help of Russian arms 
and through the Treaty of Berlin, July 13, 1778, were 
recognized as independent from the Ottoman Empire. The early 
20th century saw the Serbian government ignite the fuse that 
sparked the Great War and its progeny, the fall of the great 
multinational empires, worldwide depression, World War II, 
and the Cold War. From the carnage of the Great War, 
representatives of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Montenegro 
announced the creation of a new South Slav confederation, 
Yugoslavia, under the ruling Serbian dynasty. The history of this 
federation was troubled and violent with the Serbs attempting to 
create a centralized Serb state and the other nationalities 
resisting this effort in an attempt to maintain some degree of 
autonomy.  
The Post Cold War period has witnessed both 
globalization and a revival of nationalism by oppressed peoples. 
The breakup of the Soviet Union and the fragmentation of 
Yugoslavia are two of the more dramatic examples of these 
phenomena. The policies of the Yugoslavian (Serbian) 
government under Slobodan Milosevic have only exacerbated 
and accelerated nationalistic tensions. The 20th century, which 
began with such promise for Serbia, has ended in failure and 
frustration. During the 1990s, Serbian power has been serially 
excluded from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and 
Kosovo. All that is left outside Serbia proper is the Voivodina 
and Montenegro. And Serbia continues to try to hold on to what 
remains using the same failed policies that have proved so 
counterproductive in the past. 
If Montenegro goes the way of the other republics, the 
idea of Yugoslavia is a dead letter. Serbia will lose her access to 
the sea. Therefore, Serbian policy and the ability to salvage 
something from the current series of debacles are extremely 
important issues for the peace and stability of the Balkans and 
Eastern Europe. And crucial in all this is the policy of the 
S
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Russian Federation towards Serbia and the Balkans and 
Montenegro in particular. It is the Russians who have shown an 
affinity to aid their South Slav cousins from the Tsarist Empire, 
through the Soviet Union, even onto Boris Yeltsin’s Russian 
Federation.  
The principal author looks at the Montenegrin question 
from an East-European perspective in the wake of Western 
opposition to ethnic cleansing and other distasteful practices, 
examining the ideas of Yugoslavian unity, the notion of a 
Greater Serbia, and the possibility and implications of 
Montenegrin independence. Crucial to the outcome is the extent 
to which Russia will come to the aid of Serbian policies. This 
question is addressed and possible outcomes discussed below. 
Many Montenegrins do not want independence but 
pledge allegiance to Greater Serbia and will support Milosevic. 
The Serbian refugees from Kosovo and Bosnia, some 32,000 of 
whom are currently living in Montenegro, will also oppose 
secession.  
Montenegro: Vassal or Sovereign? 
 
6
STRATEGIC  SIGNIFICANCE OF MONTENEGRO  
 
 
ontenegro has never before enjoyed the international 
importance it currently commands. The Montenegrin 
leadership is shuttling to Western capitals where it is assured of 
increased support, Western strategic analysts focus their 
attention on the country, and NATO officers fill their folders 
with detailed maps and aerial photos of the region. There is a 
simple explanation for the sudden international prominence that 
this small region now enjoys: Montenegro is the final element of 
the Yugoslav federation outside of Serbia. Montenegrin 
independence would end of the dream of a nation of southern 
Slavs and, as some optimists predict, the beginning of a 
democratic Serbia, an event which might bring a long awaited 
stability to the Balkans. A Western-oriented Montenegro would 
firmly isolate Serbia and Milosevic, make the economic blockade 
work and bring an end to the Milosevic regime. However, the 
mountainous republic may have to pay too a high price for its 
independence. Strategists fear that “Montenegro will all too 
likely be the next war in the series that have pockmarked the 
death of the fantasy of Greater Serbia”. 1 
Indeed, the little Adriatic country of 650,000 inhabitants 
and 13,812 square kilometers, the size of US state of Connecticut, 
with no important mineral resources, and no strategic 
infrastructure has never before enjoyed such international 
prominence. It has been an isolated borderland that even the 
Turks were unable to control, paying little attention to the 
remote mountainous theocracy after the conquest of Serbia in 
1389. In 1918, after more then five centuries of semi-
independence , Serbian King Alexander Karadjordjevic, a son-in-
law of Montenegrin King Nikola, backed by the Treaty of 
Versailles, incorporated Montenegro into the newly established 
kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, treating the inhabitants 
of Montenegro as Serbs. During this period, all symbols or 
                                                 
1 SMITH Dan, “Integrating Serbia into the Balkan region”, Security Dialog Vol 30(3), 
PRIO, SAGE publications, 1999. 
M
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reminders of Montenegrin sovereignty were suppressed. Even 
the traditional Montenegrin hat which displayed the Cyrillic 
initials of King Nikola was banned and a new Serbian symbol 
was required to be worn atop formal hats.  
In 1945 Tito granted federal status to allied Montenegro 
to increase the voting power of Belgrade in the eight-man 
collective leadership of the newly established Yugoslav 
federation, relying on Montenegrins as the most loyal allies of 
Serbia. In this period, vestiges of the old monarchy were 
suppressed and Montenegrins seemed to accept their place in 
the Yugoslav federation. Apparently loyal to the end, 
Montenegro was the only part of Yugoslavia that voted in the 
1992 referendum to stay in federation.  
The symbolic role of Montenegro assumed great 
importance over the years. The only Balkan military force not 
defeated by the Turks, it was seen by many as a beacon in their 
fight for independence. The Russians regarded Montenegro as 
the first free Slavic nation in the Balkans and their natural ally, 
while the Serbians saw Montenegro as the beginning of the 
Serbian independence and the cornerstone of Greater Serbia. The 
rocky highlands of Montenegro (Crna Gora), with their nucleus 
on the Zeta River, served as an important refuge to Serbs fleeing 
from the advancing Turks in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries. Montenegro resisted as a semi-autonomous theocracy 
for three centuries before becoming fully independent at the end 
of the eighteenth century. 2 
According to the 1991 census, the current inhabitants of 
Montenegro identify themselves 62% as Montenegrins, 9% as 
Serbs, 7% as Albanians, 15% as Muslims and 7% as others. Many 
Montenegrins regard themselves as Serbs just as the Bavarians 
regard themselves as Germans. Others support the creation of a 
separate Montenegrin nation, a separate state and a separate 
church. While the majority of the population belongs to the 
Orthodox Christian tradition (Montenegrins and Serbs), there is 
also a large Muslim population and smaller numbers of Roman 
Catholics.  
                                                 
2 G.W. Hoffman: “The Balkans in Transition”,  D. Van Nostrand Company. New Jersey, 
1963, p.40. 
Nikola Bacevic wearing 
traditional costume and hat. 
An enlargement of the picture 
showing the King's initials. 
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The geography of Montenegro is dominated by two high 
mountain ranges going across the country. The Montenegrin 
seacoast is a narrow strip of land running from Kotor bay near 
Croatia to the Bojana River at the frontier with Albania. The high 
Dinaric mountains of Orjen, Lovcen and Rimija rise from the sea, 
forming a magnificent background to the coastal strip but a great 
obstacle to communication between the coastal and inland parts 
of Montenegro. The old capital of Montenegro —Cetinje, is 
hidden high on the mountain of Lovcen. The Zeta plain 
bordering lake Skadar comprises the biggest lowland region of 
Montenegro and the most fertile area. It is dominated by the 
economic and political center of Montenegro —Podgorica 
(former Titograd), the country capital accounting for 130.000 
inhabitants. The second range of high mountains, composed of 
Durmitor, Komovi and Sinjajevina, separates the center of the 
country from the northern plateau of Sandjak. Historically, it 
was the Ottoman province of Sandjak that cut apart for long time 
Montenegro and Serbia and prevented their earlier unification. 
Divided between two republics in 1945, it remains home for 
much of the region's dispersed Muslim population.  
Montenegro traces its identity from one of the first 
kingdoms in the Balkans called Duklja  (independent since 1077), 
later Zeta and finally Montenegro . In the 12th century the 
principality became a battlefield between the Catholic and 
Orthodox missionaries under the Croatian and Serbian (called 
Raska at that time) influences. In 1186 Raska conquered Duklja 
and its inhabitants converted to Orthodoxy. Since 1455, when 
Serbia was defeated at Kosovo Polje, Zeta resisted the Turkish 
penetration. While the Serbian church was subordinated to the 
Turkish Patriarchy of Constantinople, the Montenegrin 
Autocephalic Church functioned independently and was 
recognized by the Russian Synod and the Eastern Pope of 
Constantinople. Its elected leader, the Vladyka, became the 
supreme authority of the theocracy. Cetinje, the Montenegrin 
capital since 1482 and the mountain Lovcen today are symbols of 
the highlanders’ ethic of honesty, courage and loyalty to their 
country. The Berlin Congress of 1878 formally recognized the 
independence of Montenegro and for 40 years Cetinje, one of the 
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smallest European capitals was the host of many foreign 
embassies (notably the Austrian, French, Russian, British and 
Italian). 3 
The continuing fragmentation of Yugoslavian federation 
and the wave of changes in the region since the fall of the Iron 
Curtain placed Montenegro in a completely new geopolitical 
environment. Montenegro suddenly found itself bordered by 
five political entities, namely Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(exclusively Republica Srbska), Serbia proper, Kosovo and 
Albania. If before Montenegro was simply an isolated seaside 
resort on the Yugoslav Adriatic coastline, today it may provide 
for critical transportation links between Croatia and Albania, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. There are calls to begin using 
Montenegro’s port of Bar to help supply aid to Kosovo. 4 
Recently Montenegro has opened customs offices on Albanian 
and Croatian borders, however it still has unresolved a dispute 
with Croatia over the possession of Prevlaka half-island in 
Southern Croatia. This strategic peninsula controls the entrance 
to Kotor Bay and it is currently under observation by the UN 
military observer mission (UNMOP). 5  
While visiting the region this spring, Octavian Sofransky 
observed that, for, Serbians Montenegro represents not only a 
critical route to the sea through the ports of Bar and Kotor, but 
also a physical expression of the idea of Yugoslavia unity. 
Montenegrins regard Serbia as their most significant economic 
partner and a long-standing ally but they also view it as 
something of an albatross. They complain that as long as 
Belgrade is a pariah in Western eyes, isolated politically and 
economically, Montenegro has to bear the same “yoke.” 
Today, along with all the countries in the Southeastern 
Europe, Montenegro is going through a painful economic and 
political transition. Ten years after the end of the Cold War it 
became clear that the majority of the states in the region have 
opted for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, a path that 
guarantees a long-term stability and a clear prospective of 
                                                 
3 For more information see The Montenegrin Association of America Home Page. 
4 “The next Balkan Crisis” – The New York Times – Editorial, posted April 21,2000 
through www.montenegro.com . 
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economic development. All of these countries, but Yugoslavia, 
have in one form or another engaged in the integration process 
with the European Union and NATO. The most advanced 
candidates, such as Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, have 
opened negotiations for a full membership in the European 
Union. They are also the forerunners for NATO membership. 
Countries like Albania, Macedonia and, since recently, Croatia 
are members of the Partnership for Peace program sponsored by 
NATO. Even Yugoslavia, should it not too sound droll, through 
its foreign minister, has unveiled its strategic goal to become 
part of the European Union.6  
What one observes in the Balkans today is a complex 
process of integration that proceeds at various speeds. 
Throughout the region, both university scholars and government 
officials speak of the urgency of creating a more effective 
regional framework. Recognition of the need for a more 
concerted, balanced, regional approach in cooperation was 
demonstrated by the creation of the Stability pact for South-
eastern Europe in 1999. The crucial significance of this 
agreement is that through its concluding Cooperation and 
Association agreements, it offers the prospect, though a remote 
one, of membership in the European Union for all the countries 
in the region. Macedonia was first to benefit from this status, and 
Croatia and Albania are following in line. 
The notorious exception to this integration process is the 
politically and economically isolated and authoritarian Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, within which Montenegrins increasingly 
voice their dissatisfaction. Given its isolationist past and an 
affinity to Serbia few can predict the future of Montenegro. 
Several options appear plausible. The first envisions an 
independent  Montenegro, coming out of a non-violent divorce 
with Serbia, as one of prosperous Adriatic mini-states, living on 
tourism and commerce from a larger Europe. The second scenario 
sees Montenegro as still a part of Yugoslavia, provided a 
democratic transition takes place, as an equal part of a 
                                                                                                           
5 CIA Home Page. 
6 VUKOVIC Borislav, “Yugoslavi a and the European Union”, Review of International 
Affairs, 1999. 
Montenegro: Vassal or Sovereign? 
 
11
confederation. The third scenario predicts a violent break-up 
with Serbia, transforming Montenegro into a NATO 
protectorate, similar to Kosovo or Bosnia-Herzegovina, living on 
donations from the international community.  Indeed, the crucial 
question asked by international community and the 
Montenegrins themselves today is how to avoid violence and to 
reach towards the European and world community  at the same 
time. 
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INTERNAL POLITICAL DUALISM 
 
 
he bicephalous Montenegri n eagle reflects perfectly the 
dilemma of the country today. One head is looking to 
Brussels and the West and the other remains loyal to Belgrade. 
Since the 1999 crisis in Kosovo, the Montenegrin polity is 
crystallizing around the two options: independence  or a 
continued federation. As in 1918, when the local assembly voted 
the unification with Serbia, the Montenegrin patriots under the 
green flag confront the Yugoslav patriots under the white. 
The Green camp is growing constantly. Traditionally 
supported by the nationalist wing, the Diaspora, and the 
Montenegrin Autocephalous Orthodox Church, for the last two 
years it has attracted on its orbit more and more moderate 
parties and voters. The incumbent president, Milo Djukanovic, 
has lately emerged as a leader of the Montenegro drive for 
sovereignty against Belgrade autocratic rule. 
The electoral block headed by Milo Djukanovic, “Da 
Zivimo Bolje,” won the 1998 parliamentary elections with 49,54% 
of the votes over the pro-Serbian Serbian National Party (SNP 
which received 36,1% of the vote. The three parties of the 
coalition—Social Democrat party (SDP) of Zarko Rackevic, the 
People’s Party (NS) of Dragan Soc and Djukanovic’s Democratic 
Socialist Party (DPS), have advanced a common “Platform,” 
where they call Belgrade to accept confederate relations, 
stopping short from independence.  
Djukanovic, the president of Montenegro since the 1997 
elections and a former Prime Minister, is an aparatchik. 
However, since becoming president he has sharply criticized 
Milosevic for his confrontation with the West, and has enacted 
liberal reforms, launching a program of privatization, 
introducing the Deutsche Mark as the second currency in the 
country, and seeking cooperation with Montenegro’s neighbors. 
During the NATO bombing campaign in 1999, Djukanovic 
blamed Milosevic for provoking the strikes but also called on 
NATO to stop the bombing. He repeatedly addressed the 
T
Milo Djukanovic, President of 
Montenegro
Montenegrin coat of arms
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Western countries and international financial institutions for aid 
and investment, which yet was slow to come partly because of 
the blockade on Yugoslavia, partly because of unclear status of 
relations between Montenegro and Serbia. Internationally, the 
federation of Montenegro with Serbia is not recognized by the 
United States and many others, Russia and Cuba being among 
the few exceptions. 7 
Since 1999 the idea of a referendum on independence has 
become increasingly attractive to many Montenegrins. 
Djukanovic uses it as a leverage against Milosevic in order to 
obtain a “Redefinition of relations with FRY”, which in fact 
would mean the maintenance of loose political affiliation with 
Belgrade and at the same time an opportunity to enact 
independent economic policies and qualify for western aid and 
investment. So far Milosevic has worked against this proposal by 
sponsoring pro-Serbian parties and increasing the Yugoslav 
army presence in the region. The utility of the Yugoslav army, 
according to Belgrade professor Vojin Dimitrievic, is greatly 
enhanced by the fact that it is the only federal institution that 
still functions in this fractured nation.8  
The Liberal Alliance (LSCG) headed by Slavko Perovic, 
the most active promoter of independence, has however stayed 
aside from the governing coalition. Its supporters argue that 
Montenegro, as an independent nation was abusively 
incorporated into Yugoslav kingdom and the Montenegrin 
Autocephalous Church was subordinated by force to the Serbian 
Orthodox Church in 1920. Surviving in exile, for instance in 
Detroit, USA, the Montenegrin Autocephalic Orthodox Church 
was reactivated in Cetinje in 1993. In the same year Dr. Vojslav 
Nikcevic published a book suggesting that “Montenegrins speak 
and write Montenegrin”, different from Croatian or Serbian. 
Today independence is actively supported by the Montenegrin 
Diaspora, scattered around North America and Europe, which 
plan to hold their Second World Congress in August, 2000 in the 
                                                 
7 The US view is that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) has dissolved 
and that none of the successor republics represents its continuation. Source: CIA Home 
Page. 
8 Interview, Graz, July 1, 2000. 
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old Montenegrin capital of Cetinje under the patronage of 
President Milo Djukanovic.  
Summing up, on the issue of independence, Djukanovic 
can rely on his voters, the radical nationalists from LSCG, the 
support of the Diaspora, the Montenegrin Autocephalous 
Church and the 20,000 strong Montenegrin police as well as 
many Albanians and Muslims antagonized by Milosevic’s 
behavior during the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.  
On the other side there are the supporters of maintaining 
Montenegro as a part of Yugoslavia. Their leader, Momir 
Bulatovic, the former president of Montenegro, is backed by 
Milosevic, himself a Montenegrin, loyal Serbs and Montenegrins 
as well as the 10.000 strong Yugoslav army and 1.000 pro-Serb 
paramilitaries. Recently the Second Yugoslav Army located in 
the republic was reinforced by 240 Kosovo hard-liners replacing 
officers of Montenegrin origins.  
Momir Bulatovic’s Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro 
(SNP) is the strongest single party in the country and has 
established an electoral coalition known as “Yugoslavia – SNP – 
Momir Bulatovic.”  The coalition is an attempt to unite the pro-
Yugoslav forces in the republic and is specificall y addressed to 
two small Serb-nationalist parties: Serb Radical Party (SRS) and 
Serb People’s party (SNS), which so far failed to gain 
representation in the parliament. However, conversations with 
various members of these parties indicate that the coalition will 
not be easily maintained since the SRS does not recognize 
Montenegro as a state or as a Montenegrin nation. This view, 
they acknowledge, is rather unpopular in Montenegro.  
Historically, besides Serbia, Yugoslavian patriotism has 
found a more fertile ground in Montenegro, which saw itself as 
the lighthouse of the southern Slavic independence. The 
Montenegrins were ferocious fighters in the World War II 
resistance movement, they had a disproportionately high 
percentage of members in the Yugoslav communist party, and 
they were always over-represented on the federal level. Many 
Montenegrins will comment that they always went to Serbia to 
go to school and to assume authority. In addition, there is a large 
population in Serbia of Montenegrin origins, while at the same 
Montenegro: Vassal or Sovereign? 
 
15
time there is a large community of Serbs and Serb refugees in 
Montenegro itself. Just several years ago Montenegrins fought 
along with Serbs for Yugoslav unity in Dubrovnik.  
In addition to ideology and politics, the economy plays 
an important  role in the development of this region. 
Montenegro, along with Macedonia and Kosovo, was one of the 
poorest republics of Yugoslavia. However, it was the Yugoslav 
central planning that allowed Montenegro to jump from a 
backward feudal society into industrialization and urbanization 
and also become a tourist paradise in summer.  Since the 
beginning of the recent crisis in Yugoslavia the heavy industry 
has been dragging and the only revenues are provided by 
Serbian tourists, and, increasingly, by smuggling. Montenegrin 
government sources acknowledge that years of sanctions have 
fueled the black economy and the smuggling of cigarettes into 
Rome, which is costing Italy millions in tax revenues. 9 Indeed, 
many speed boats anchored in Kotor Bay belong to veteran 
smugglers who earned their fortunes in the Bosnian war when a 
liter of gasoline smuggled by Albanians over Skadar lake could 
be sold to Bosnian Serbs for a fivefold price. 
While the living standards dropped by more then 50%, 
“the only thing that Montenegrin authorities have been doing 
efficiently for all these ten years is controlling the national 
economic resources and their distribution among the 
nomenclatura  pyramid members,” argue local experts.10 The 
recent “monetary divorce” between the two republics, with 
Montenegro resorting to the DM as its second currency, 
highlighted the deterioration in their relations. Serbia has 
retaliated by closing its markets to Montenegrin exporters and 
denying Montenegro subsidized food that keeps ordinary Serbs 
from starving.  
Traditionally, the Montenegrin coast was the summer 
destination for the inhabitants of the Yugoslav capital Belgrade 
with thousands of them flooding through Tivat airport to 
elegant Venetian-style city-ports of Budva, Kotor, Perast or 
                                                 
9 “Italy’s Mafia obsession aids Milosevic-Montenegro”, December 28, Brussels, (Reuters) 
by montenegro.com.  
10 Weekly political report, May 11, 2000 by montenegro.com  
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numerous villas overlooking the sea. Today these people worry 
that they might have to sell their holiday properties again, as 
they did in Croatia. Even without the possible disruption of a 
move for Montenegrin independence, the prices for food and 
basic services on the coast are so high that they cannot be met by 
scarce wages back in Serbia.  
Today, Montenegrins insist that the West must subsidize 
Montenegro until Milosevic leaves power. While they express 
gratitude that the United States has committed $55 million in 
technical  assistance, budget support and humanitarian aid for 
Montenegro in 2000 and plans a similar commitment in 2001, 
they maintain that more is necessary. Some disappointment has 
been expressed at the reaction of other international actors who 
have responded to Montenegro’s crisis. While the European 
Union announced that it would double its aid to Montenegro 
from 10 to 20 million Euro this year, the World Bank president 
James Wolfenson stated that he “was under legal obligation not 
to act in Montenegro because it was not a member of the bank.11 
Many Montenegrin officials privately concede that they are 
forced to place greater reliance on individual countries, such as 
Germany, which have played a more consistent role in 
providing investment guarantees for companies  prepared to 
invest in Montenegro.  
In the spring of 2000, Montenegro found itself in what 
local observers refer to as “the shade of a volcano.” The drive for 
independence and the counter-drive slowly polarized the 
society. If in February 1998 the majority  of Montenegrins were 
still favoring the federation, then by September 1999 the relative 
majority had switched to independence and this trend was on 
the increase this year. The local elections in Podgorica and 
Herzeg-Novi, held on June 11, were seen as the test for support 
for both rival camps in Montenegro. “During the oncoming 
elections the citizens will be in fear of a monetary strike by 
Belgrade, Yugoslav Army seventh battalion, Montenegro 
liberals”, said a local analyst. 12  According to Srdjan Darmanovi c, 
                                                 
11 “EU urges more international support for Montenegro”, posted March 29, 2000 by 
montenegro.com.  
12 “Weekly political report”, May 11, 2000 by montenegro.com  
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a local political analyst, the elections indicated that there is a 
slow but firm trend in favor of Djukanovic government while 
strengthening his party’s position in the capital in spite of losing 
some voters in Herzeg-Novi.”13 Indeed, Podgorica, the country’s 
capital, accounts for one forth of the total electorate while 
Herzeg-Novi, a small town on the Bosnian border, is also home 
for some 5,000 Yugoslav refugees. “The European and American 
assistance, provided to Podgorica, not to Herzeg-Novi, 
undoubtedl y helped Djukanovic’s turnout, since every local vote 
here has larger political connotation,” added Darmanovic.  
Table 1. Preferred status of Montenegro 14 
 Federation Independence  Confederation  
February 1998. 51.7 % 21.0 % 10.5 % 
May 1999. 38.8 % 28.9 % 20.5 % 
September 1999. 27.6 % 32.3 % 19.6 % 
January 2000. 28.0 % 36.1 % 22.5 % 
 
President Milo Djukanovic has threatened to call a 
referendum on the question of independence in the near future. 
“So, this spring or a bit later the referendum will happen,” 
Djukanovic declared on the 4th of April. “Serbia is sinking deeper 
and deeper, its debts are accumulating, it has imposed a 
blockade on Montenegro, and is playing various tricks.”  15 “A 
referendum offering a straight choice between Yugoslavia and 
independe nce could probably be won now,” experts of the 
International Crisis Group have stated.16 The opinion polls show 
a constant increase in support for independence. In July 2000, 
surveys indicated that 39.7% of Montenegrins were in favor of 
separation of Montenegro from Yugoslavia. 17 
On the other side, there are fears of a forced removal 
from office of Montenegro’s pro-independence president. US 
                                                 
13 Interview, Perast, July 20, 2000 
14 “Public Opinion in Crna Gora”, CEDEM, Podgorica, April 2000. 
15 “Montenegro might hold independence referendum within months: minister”, April 4, 
2000 by montenegro.com  
16 “Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano”, March 21, 2000, ICG Home Page 
17 “Za i protiv otcepljenja Crne Gore od Jugoslavije”, Blic Montenegro, July 20, 2000 
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Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has repeatedly warned 
Milosevic that “any change by force of political situation of 
Montenegro will be sanctioned.” NATO’s European former 
military leader Wesley Clark told a news conference that Serbia 
is clearly preparing for possible military action against pro-
western Montenegro. Clark declined to comment on any military 
preparatio ns NATO may have made in this respect, but clearly 
warned Milosevic not to interfere. 18 Both officials and the 
average citizens express great concern about the role of a 1,000 
member paramilitary force created by the Serbian government 
and recently stationed in Montenegro. For them, such a 
development is an ominous accompaniment to the already 
threatening role of the 10,000- man Yugoslav Second Army that 
has taken over Montenegrin airports and set up pro-Serbian 
television stations on its Montenegrin bases. Montenegrin 
officials complain, both in private as well as in public, that the 
Serbs are taking these actions in an effort to provoke President 
Djukanovic into overreacting in a manner that will bring about 
popular support in Serbia for a military move against 
Montenegro.  
In the meantime Milosevic is attempting to exercise his 
final instrument of leverage against Montenegro. In July 2000, 
the federal assembly, disregarding the opposition, passed 
amendments to the constitution of Yugoslavia, paving the way 
for a new mandate to Milosevic. In response Filip Vujanovic, the 
Chairman of Montenegrin Parliament, announced that the 
government coalition of Montenegro will boycott federal 
elections due in the fall, saying that “Montenegro will not 
participate in any elections that would mean the ruling of 
Slovodan Milosevic.” 19 On August 25, in an effort to limit local 
participation in the elections, the Montegrin government banned 
state media coverage of the election campaign. This ban covered 
all 16 of Montenegro’s public television and radio stations. Many 
analysts in Montegro warn of possible strikes on Montenegro 
after the conclusion of the elections.  
                                                 
18 NATO sees threat to Montenegro, warns Serbia, Lisbon, posted on March 29 (Reuters) 
posted on montenegro.com.  
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Western support for Djukanovic was partly predicated 
on the judgement that, in the absence of credible opposition in 
Serbia, he constituted the only serious opposition to Milosevic in 
the Yugoslav context aiming at making Djukanovic the 
figurehead for all the opposition to Milosevic. 20 However, while 
last year the Western powers have urged Montenegro not to try 
to secede from Yugoslavia but to join Serbian opposition to 
confront Milosevic and work for democracy “from within,” now 
the option of independence might be the only one feasible.21 A 
new attempt to unite Serbian opposition under one banner failed 
again this July in Svety-Stefan, a Montenegrin resort. In speaking 
with Octavian Sofransky, many people from Podgorica, Belgrade 
and Zagreb expressed their conviction that Yugoslavia’s 
enduring political crisis is beyond the control of the 
“democratic” forces. For these individuals, the only answer is 
one that would come from within Milosevic’s political 
entourage.  
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata 
said she did not see Montenegro becoming the next Balkan flash 
point. However the UNHCR was building up emergency 
facilities in the region, though she was cautiously optimistic the 
tense situation would not escalate like Kosovo last year.22 The 
international crisis group has called for a slow internalization of 
Montenegro through infiltration of NGOs and other initiatives.  
EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy 
Javier Solana agreed that Montenegro should stay within the 
Yugoslav federation but with closer contacts with other nation in 
the region.23 Meanwhile in Podgorica, President Milo 
Djukanovic said that Bodo Hombach, who heads EU's Balkan 
Stability Pact, recently promised him that Montenegro will 
                                                                                                           
19 “The governing coalition will boycott federal elections”, Pobjeda, Podgorica, 
July 23, 2000 
20 GOW James, “Montenegro: Where to take the fight”, Security Dialog Vol 
30(3), PRIO, SAGE publications, 1999. 
21 Italy’s Mafia obsession aids Milosevic-Montenegro, December 28, Brussels, 
(Reuters) by montenegro.com.  
22 UNHCR says Montenegro not next Balkan flashpoint, Tirana, March 26 
(Reuters) by www.montenegro.com  
23 Montenegro should stay in Yugoslavia, (AP/MTI), March 29, by montenegro.com  
Montenegro: Vassal or Sovereign? 
 
20
attend the pact's meeting in Thessaloniki in July as a full 
participant. 24  
The more radical members of this camp declared that 
“the Serb preparations for violent intervention against 
Montenegro’s President Milo Djukanovic are clear and present… 
Staying out of Montenegro will be impossible… Balkan stability 
and Yugoslavia’s existence are in direct contradiction… Three 
more viable states – independent Montenegro and Kosovo, plus 
a democratic Serbia – may be the most stable outcome… To end 
Balkan instability requires far more than bombing from 15,000 
feet and peace-enforcement. It may, ultimately, require military 
force to ensure the dismemberment of Yugoslav remnants.” 25 
                                                 
24 RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 4, No. 99, Part II, 23 May 2000. 
25 “For Balkan peace, final split needed”, May 11, 2000 by montenegro.com  
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RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE BALKANS  
 
 
hile Serbia has long been the dominant influence on 
Montenegrin affairs, Russia has also played an 
important role in this region. In spite of increased international 
attention, until recently, Russia has kept quiet on Montenegro. 26 
Since the peace in Kosovo, Russian political establishment was 
too busy with internal matters, such as the election of the new 
president and the “antiterrorist campaign” in Chechnya, to 
follow-up on Yugoslav developments. The newly elected 
Russian president Vladimir Putin prioritized the revitalization of 
the system of vertical power inside Russia, while most foreign 
policy objectives have been postponed. In a recent speech, the 
foreign Minister Ivanov has described as priorities of the Russian 
foreign policy the strategic balance with NATO and major super-
powers and the “near-abroad” CIS states as its sphere of 
strategic interest. 27 
A long-time Montenegrin ally, Russia’s contemporary 
concerns are very different from those it had during the Russian-
Turkish wars when Montenegrin Admiral Mateja Zmajevic 
fought under the Russian flag, and the naval school in Perast, an 
ancient Montenegrin port, was training Russian marines. If 
anything reminds one of Russia in Montenegro today, it is the 
portraits of Russian emperors in historical museums and the 
icons donated to the Montenegrin Orthodox churches by their 
Russian protectors a long time ago. “Our relations with Russia 
pertain to the past” – say many Montenegrins. However one can 
spot symbols of the new Russia in Montenegro as well. The 
vanguard of Russia’s oil exporters Luk Oil has made its presence 
felt in the country and a new air route has opened this year 
connecting Podgorica and Moscow. Russians seems to be 
interested in acquiring property on the sunny Adriatic coast, 
                                                 
26 A search of the archives of major Russian newspapers shows literally nothing on 
Montenegro.  
27 The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, Volume V, Number 8 (16 May 
2000).  
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bearing in mind that this is a visa free country, while 
Montenegrin businessmen, in turn, are eager to open the 
immense Russian market for their goods.  On the diplomatic side, 
the Montenegrin authorities, following their goal for 
international recognition have set-up a “representation” in 
Moscow and in exchange, a Russian consulate opened in 
Podgorica.  
If Montenegro has any importance for Russia today, it 
will be derived from the larger Russian games in the region, 
especially its “protection” of Belgrade on one side and relations 
with NATO on the other. As an example, the controversial 
“humanitarian” convoy that was stopped by Hungarian officials 
from reaching Yugoslavia in April 1999 had announced its 
destination as Montenegro. 
One can say that the Balkan policy of the Russian 
Federation has entered a new phase. During the 19th century in 
an attempt to gain the access to Mediterranean, the Russian 
Empire dressed itself as a savior of Balkan, particularly Slavic 
nations, sponsoring the independence movements of the 
Montenegrins, Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks. Soviet Russia, after 
winning World War II, attempted to control the entire Balkans 
ideologically. The current Russian Federation has adopted the 
role of a distant observer from its bases in eastern Moldova and 
Sevastopol on the Black Sea. Since NATO made it clear that it 
regards Southeastern Europe as a zone of its strategic interest, 
Russia, after signing a Russia-NATO charter, has tried to avoid a 
direct confrontation with NATO, while occasionally testing the 
waters or attempting to bargain for some advantages.  
If Russia has tempered its Balkan aspirations for the 
moment, then some countries in the region continue to nurture 
warm feelings towards their former ally. This is true for Bulgaria 
and especially for the politically and economically isolated 
Serbia. In a desperate attempt to receive badly needed external 
support during the height of the Kosovo crisis, Milosevic has 
appealed to Russia as a “traditional ally,” with the request to 
admit Serbia into the Russia - Belarus Union. Setting aside the 
geographic unfeasibility of the project, Serbia being isolated 
from Russia by EU and NATO candidates, the current Union 
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itself is hardly functioning economically or politically . In Russia 
an opinion poll has revealed that only 28% of the public favor 
the Union while 69% are against. 28 It is seen with reservation in 
Moscow, as an economic burden and a political embarrassment, 
due primarily to President Lukashenko’s notoriously 
undemocratic rule in Belarus.  The rationale of Union survival 
lies in the geo-strategic realm, namely Moscow’s fear of NATO 
reaching Russian frontiers. Milosevic’s appeal generated little 
support among the Kremlin leadership, thus demonstrating the 
limited geo-strategic significance of Yugoslavia for Russia today. 
Instead, Moscow’s reaction to the Kosovo crises focused on a 
diplomatic effort to get a stake in the post-conflict arrangement 
and on military maneuvering to test the cohesion of NATO 
forces. At home, anti-NATO campaigns have found fertile 
ground among Russian nationalists, but debates about the cost 
of peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia indicated that 
other concerns were driving Russian politics. The Yugoslav 
ambassador to Moscow, Borislav Milosevic, in an interview 
given to the weekly “Vek,” acknowledged that the idea of joining 
the Russia-Belarus Union had been discussed in Belgrade before 
the bombing, and on March 24, 2000, the Yugoslav parliament 
requested observer status in the Union. Yet he had to confess 
that the idea of the Union is opposed by both the Yugoslav 
opposition and Montenegro. 29 The appeal was followed by 
Milosevic’s petition to the presidents of Russia and Belarus in 
which he declared that “Yugoslavia is ready to join the Union.” 
Among his arguments were economic complementarity, 
“multiculturalism,” the common Orthodox religion and Islam as 
the second largest religion in the country. What was this if not a 
vaguely camouflaged reference to the Russian experience in 
“deterring Islamic extremism” in Chechnya?  
Though Yugoslavia as a whole might have supported 
Milosevic’s move to an alliance with Russia, in Montenegro 
things are seen differently. A recent opinion poll shows that only 
16% of ethnic Montenegrins in the republic support adherence to 
                                                 
28 Moscow News opinion polls, 15-22.04.1999, MN Home Page. 
29 SOLOVIEV Vladimir, “Belgrade longing for an Union”, Vek weekly, No. 8, March 25-03, 
2000. 
Russia+Belarus+Yugoslavia=???
(Komsomolskaya Pravda, April 1999)
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Russia-Belarus Union compared to 53% of ethnic Serbs. The 
same source indicates that both Serbs (65%) and Montenegrins 
(87%) support the eventual accession of Montenegro to the 
European Union.30 
The idea of aligning with Russia is not new in 
Yugoslavia. Vojslav Sesel, the leader of the Serbian Radical 
Party, voiced it first back in 1993, but no one took it seriously at 
that time. It is not surprising, however, that it was resurrected in 
1999 under the imminence of NATO bombing. Russia and 
Yugoslavia have signed an agreement on military cooperation, 
but it was suspended because of the UN embargo, and Belgrade 
made a new attempt to involve Russia on its side. 
In an article published in Komsomolskaya Pravda on April 
14, 1999, the editorialists  strike the direct question: “Will a new 
treaty imply an obligation of military assistance to Yugoslavia?  
Will this help with solving the conflict? Will this involve the 
Russian nuclear potential and will Russia be dragged into a 
Balkan conflict? Do we need a base on the Adriatic?” The 
authors themselves concluded that “the status of a country not 
involved in the conflict is more ponderous on the international 
arena than a suicidal intervention, and therefore Russia should 
limit itself to peaceful means of intervention.” 31 
The Russian political scene had an unequal reaction on 
the Yugoslav initiative. Constantin Zatulin, leader of the 
“Derzava” movement, said that rather than signing-up for a sure 
defeat, Russia should increase assistance to Yugoslavia, 
especially through deliveries of military equipment. Alexei 
Mitrofanov from the ultra-nationalist LDPR (Zhirinovski’s party) 
argued for accepting Yugoslavia into the Union and bringing the 
country under the Russian nuclear umbrella, an act that, in his 
opinion, will guarantee the end of the conflict and resurrect the 
legendary Russian might. Elena Zazulina from the reformist 
“Yabloko” block insisted that an Union can be debated only after 
                                                 
30 “Public Opinion in Crna Gora”, CEDEM, Podgorica, April 2000. 
31 BARANETZ Victor, TCHIZIKOV Maxim, “Russia+Belarus+Yugoslavia=???”, 
Komsomolskaya  Pravda, April 14, 1999. 
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the end of military conflict, and pointed to a referendum as the 
only legitimate means.32 
Russian hawks trumpeted the issue of military 
involvement throughout the conflict. In an interview with a 
popular Russian daily, Sergei Govoruhin, complained that 
“today no one takes Russia into account” and “NATO freely 
demonstrated its superiority during the rocket-aerial voyage in 
Yugoslavia.” He urged that the only way to stop the war is by 
delivering to Yugoslavia modern air-defense systems: “ten 
mobile C-300 units can fully control the Yugoslav air” and the 
threat of a direct Russia NATO confrontation is not higher then 
in Vietnam or Afghanistan. 33  
At the beginning of the Kosovo bombing in March 1999, 
the custom officers of Baku airport in Azerbaidjan impounded 
the Russian-made transport plane “Ruslan” with 5 jet fighters on 
board. According to accompanying documents, the cargo was to 
be transported from Kazakhstan to Slovenia; other sources, 
however, indicated its actual destination as Belgrade. 34  
On April 2, 1999 Russian military leaders made known 
that they intended to send to the Adriatic an expeditionary 
Russian fleet composed of 7 vessels: two destroyers, two guard 
vessels, a transport and an intelligence ship headed by the 
cruiser “Admiral Golovko.” 35 In the end however, only one 
Russian military ship—the Sevastopol based “Liman,” an 
hydrologist —reached Montenegrin waters some two weeks 
later. 
In spite of the calls of the hard-liners and attempts to 
blackmail NATO, more realistic views have predominated 
among Russian military and political establishments. The former 
Russian defense minister, Igor Rodionov, put it this way: 
“Russia has to give up its Soviet-time ambitions…. It should by 
no means accept to be dragged into a military conflict with 
NATO, and should focus on the internal political, economical 
and social problems particular ly on avoiding a civil war, and 
                                                 
32 “Two questions to politicians”, Komsomolskaya Pravda , April 14, 1999. 
33 “Two questions to politicians”, Komsomolskay a Pravda , April 14, 1999. 
34 “Visits”, Komsomolskaya Pravda , March 31, 1999. 
35 “Will Russian vessels crash with NATO fleet?”, Komsomolskaya Pravda, April 2, 1999. 
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thus escaping NATO “help” to Russia itself on the Yugoslav 
model.”36  
Nonetheless, during the entire Kosovo war, Russia 
actively supported Yugoslavia with intelligence information. 
The Russian General Staff was closely following the 
development of the Yugoslav situation using the land-radars 
and space-based systems of observation. NATO commanders 
accused Russia of supplying the General command of the 
Yugoslav army with intelligence data, accusations that Russia 
never denounced. Instead the Russian military proudly 
acknowledged that its suggestions helped Yugoslav army to 
avoid substantial human losses, especially for the 40,000 strong 
Serbian army in Kosovo. Other useful advice, claimed by 
Russian intelligence, was telling the Yugoslavs not to disclose 
their entire air-defense system with the beginning of air raids; 
this tactic came as a surprise for NATO planners. 37  
Trying to get international leverage and cement the 
fragmented Russian voters against an external threat on the eve 
of new presidential elections, the Moscow power holders 
attacked NATO threatening it with “strong pressure inside 
Russia for sending volunteers to the conflict, large deliveries of 
arms and including Yugoslavia in the Russia-Belarus union.38 
However, in spite of an ample anti-NATO campaign, 
Russian public opinion never favored at large military support 
for the rump Yugoslavia. If in October 1998, when 44% of 
Russian respondents in an opinion poll favored the action 
against 53%, then in April 1999, at the height of NATO strikes, 
only 36% were in favor, with 61% being against. And even if a 
larger percentage declared its readiness to go to fight as 
volunteers in Yugoslavia –67% against 27%–, there has been no 
confirmation of organized Russian military groups fighting on 
the Serbian side.39 Nor could any Russian volunteer face a 
NATO pilot flying at 30,000 feet. 
                                                 
36 “Two questions to politicians”, Komsomolskaya Pravda , April 14, 1999. 
37 PROKOPENKO Serghey and BARANETZ Victor, “Information wars”, Komsomolskaya 
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38 ARBATOV Alexey, “How to untie the Balkan nodes”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 7, 
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Vasili Axenov, a well known Russian intellectual, 
portrayed Russia as being in a double-sided situation: “One 
hand protesting, stretched in a fist, the other begging the West 
with humiliation.” 40 He condemned the ambitions of the Russian 
leadership and the “wave of hysterical anti-Americanism” and 
called upon Russia to act as a mediator.  
There is a long history of mediation in this region and the 
results of the process are well known. First, upon arriving in 
Belgrade on March 30, 1999, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny 
Primakov, accompanied by Defense Minister Sergheev and 
Foreign Minister Ivanov, proclaimed his intention to “attempt a 
political solution … by enabling Yugoslavia to defend its rights 
on the international scene.”41 Belarus President Lukashenko, in a 
visit following that of the Russian delegation, voiced his support 
for the “Primakov’s initiative” in a show of solidarity. Over the 
next two weeks the Russian ambassador in Belgrade, Yuri 
Kotov, arranged numerous visits by Russian representatives 
including the President of the Russian Duma, Gennady 
Seleznyov, the Russian Patriarch Alexi II and others. He also 
presided over the repatriation of Russian citizens, about one 
thousand of whom left Yugoslavia during the bombing 
campaign. 42 On April 22, a new Russian mediator, Victor 
Chernomyrdin, arrived to the region. Chernomyrdin, a former 
Prime Minister as well as a special representative of President 
Yeltsin, proclaimed that his mission was ”to convince USA and 
NATO to stop bombing of Yugoslavia, and the leadership of this 
country – to soften its position and relaunch the talks”.43  
In spite of this energetic campaign, Russian diplomacy has 
neither succeeded in proposing effective solutions for the crisis 
nor in securing a firm place for Russia in the post-conflict 
arrangement. Moscow’s diplomats demanded a separate zone of 
control for Russian peacekeepers, but NATO, fearing a de-facto 
partition of Kosovo much like the post-World War II partition of 
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Germany, refused to accept their claim. Feeling its honor at 
stake, the Russian military command ordered its troops to 
occupy the Pristina airport several hours before NATO, using a 
part of its peacekeeping force stationed in Bosnia. This military-
political trump was short lived, however, as the Russian 
contingent in Kosovo was forced to accept a NATO command, 
as it did in Bosnia.  
According to “Intellectual Capital”,  this maneuver was 
planned in the utmost secrecy  by the Russian Supreme 
Commander, President Yeltsin. The NATO generals were not the 
only ones taken by surprise when the Russians paratroopers 
arrived. It was only after receiving presidential approval that the 
Chief of Russian General Staff, Anatoliy Kvashnin, informed his 
nominal boss, the Russian Defense Minister Sergheev. Neither 
Prime-Minister Sergheev, nor Chief Intelligence Officer Vladimir 
Putin knew about the daring plan.44 Another strategic ploy, use 
of the Pristina airport for a large deploymen t of Russian troops, 
was proven futile when Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria 
refused to open their air space to Russian military planes. The 
Russian reaction, predictably, was negative.  
In addition, the Russians faced two real challenges: the 
lack of trained modern peace-keeping units and the financial 
costs of peace-keeping. According to Alexandr Golz in 
“Intellectual Capital”  “Moscow’s plan to control an entire sector 
in Kosovo required at least 10,000 troops while the maximum 
that the Army was able to provide was only 3,600 because the 
rest needed training and equipment that could not be ready in 
time”.45 The second issue was a financial one. Russia’s 
preference for a United Nations mandate was dictated by 
financial concerns. The NATO framework obliges each 
participating country to honor its bill and Russia would have 
had to dispense no less than $150 million a year. The Bosnian 
battalion is already taking half of the 440 million ruble annual 
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budget for peacekeeping operations as approved by the Russian 
Duma. 
During the entire course of the Yugoslav crisis, Russian 
policy on Balkans was spontaneous, reactive and highly 
contextual. The major crises, like the ones in Bosnia and Kosovo, 
brought sudden media, diplomatic, and even military 
reverberations in Moscow. When these crises were past, the 
issue was forgotten and new issues and priorities appeared: a 
new president, a new executive power, and regional reform. 
However, one should not underestimate the unpredictability of 
Russian policy and the Russian capacity to offer surprises such 
as the one in Kosovo. According to Margaret Blunden of the 
University of Westminster, “NATO’s avoidance of the UN 
Security Council was a test of Russian strength, showing that 
there is little Russia can do in the Balkans. Russians, who 
opposed bombing watched it and were completely powerless 
and inactive. However, such blatant disregard of a former 
superpower may and will backfire, as in the case of Chechnya”. 46 
By examining Russian behavior in previous Yugoslav 
conflicts one may first predict possible Russian reactions in the 
event of a greater Montenegrin crises and, second, formulate a 
policy that will prevent Russia from working against the 
interests of the international community. Generally, the Balkan 
region, including Yugoslavia, is not a high priority for the 
Russian Federation. Therefore, one may conclude that Russia 
will neither support the Montenegrin independence movement 
nor do much to save the remnants of the Yugoslav Federation. 
The most Russia can do is to offer a dethroned Milosevic 
political asylum and use him as a symbol of resistance to NATO 
expansion. Yet, as a signatory of International Human Rights 
conventions, Russia will find it embarrassing to hide a convicted 
war criminal.  
For the time being, Russia will continue to supply 
Milosevic with military intelligence but there is little chance that 
he will provide Serbia with the latest weapon systems. However, 
in a case of a protracted civil war, Russian volunteers, armed 
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with light Russian military equipment, might enter Montenegrin 
territory. Their role would likely mirror that of the several 
hundred Russian volunteers who journeyed to Serbia during the 
NATO bombing campaign in 1999. 
Should NATO forces threaten a new attack on Serbia, 
Russia would probably resume its diplomatic efforts to prevent 
military intervention while also offering its services as a 
mediator in the conflict. If intervention takes place, Russia 
would undoubtedly demand a zone of control and, if refused, it 
might once again use the Pristina airport as a landing zone. In 
Montenegro Russia could rely on popular support of the large 
pro-Serbian community.  
One question that remains unanswered is how enduring 
is Moscow’s support for Milosevic. A parallel between Russia 
and Yugoslavia reveals a large degree of commonalties but there 
are also fundamental differences. Both were multinational 
federations that disintegrated after the end of the era of Cold 
War confrontation. Both were headed by former aparatchiks 
who governed in an authoritarian manner. Both attempted to 
preserve an influence over the former satellites through military 
means. However, while nuclear Russia has encountered little 
opposition in asserting itself, the much weaker Yugoslavia has 
stumbled into a suicidal confrontation with the West. While 
Yeltsin and Milosevic spoke the same basic language and thus 
cemented their alliance during the last decade, Putin, who sees 
himself as a modernizer, might decide to use a different 
vocabulary. Hoping for a new language of political discourse, a 
delegation of Serbian opposition forces went to Moscow to 
demand an end to Russia’s unconditional backing of the 
Milosovic regime.47 Eventually, Russia will have to abandon its 
support for the authoritarian Balkan regime and look for new 
allies in a post-Cold War Southeastern Europe. Given the long 
history of mutual éntente, Montenegro might well become one of 
Russia’s new partners.  
At the July 2000, G-8 summit in Okinawa, Russian 
President Putin and US President Clinton reportedly discussed 
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Montenegro and this most recent Balkan crisis. They stressed 
“the importance of democratic government in Montenegro and 
its President Djukanovic”. 48 Many political observers in Eastern 
Europe—from Montenegro to Moldova—have seen in that a 
promise of a decline in the long-standing unconditional Russian 
support for Milosevic.  
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MULTILATERAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
MONTENEGRIN INDEPENDENCE  
 
 
 unilateral declaration of independence by 
Montenegro will bring civil war”: this is said by 
everyone in the Balkans. Milosevic would be happy to open a 
new offensive to extend his “legitimization” as the defender of 
the Yugoslavian motherland in defiance of “American 
imperialism”. Many Montenegrins who do not want 
independence, pledging allegiance to Greater Serbia, will 
support him. The community of Serbian refugees from Kosovo 
and Bosnia, some 32,000-strong in Montenegro, will also oppose 
secession. Finally, most East Europeans simply do not believe 
that anyone can defeat the Yugoslav army, always loyal to 
Milosevic, on the ground in the Balkans. 
Montenegrins, though renowned as tough fighters, have 
never taken up arms against the Serbs. In numerous 
conversations, they made this point to Octavian Sofransky 
during his visit to the region. “Going ahead with the referendum 
on independence for Montenegro would risk radicalizing a 
population still peacefully divided over the issue, and would 
offer maximum provocation to Belgrade, which retains a 
powerful military presence in Montenegro”. 49 An armed 
struggle would highlight the status of hundreds of thousands of 
Montenegrins living in Serbia. Unlike Kosovo, where Albanians 
had a large majority, which increased after the Serbs fled, or 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Serbs have obtained a territorial 
autonomy, Montenegro has no other division, than political,  
between the nationalist Greens and unionist Whites.  
During his visit to Montenegro in July, Sofransky 
observed that there is a very complex mosaic of allegiances, a 
multi-layered political process, and a grotesque historical 
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heritage that render the apparent Green and White palette 
extremely nuanced. Indeed, Montenegrin society seems to be 
made up of opposites: there are two parallel currencies—the 
Yugoslav Dinar and the German mark; two churches—the 
Serbian Patriarchate and the Montenegrin one, even two 
capitals—the capital city Cetinje and the main city Podgorica. 
Some people claim they speak Serbian, some affirm that they 
speak Montengrin, some use the Latin, some the Cyrilic 
alphabet. Almost half want an independent Montenegro while 
the other half prefers a common state with the Serbians. 
However, there is no one clear boundary within the 
Montenegrin society, since these predilections overlap and 
extend well beyond Montenegro into neighboring Serbia where 
the business class uses the Latin alphabet and the German mark 
as well. Montenegrins have conformed to duality and prefer to 
live with it rather taking one final decision.   
A negotiated settlement, leading to a non-violent 
independence for Montenegro implies an agreement from 
Belgrade. Prospects for this look grim, however, as long as this 
independence is perceived in Belgrade mainly as an anti-Serbian 
and anti-Milosevic conspiracy of the West. Since the political 
and economic pressure applied on Belgrade did not function 
before, in case of non-Serbian territories like Bosnia or Kosovo, it 
is even less probable than they might function today in 
Montenegro —“a symbol of Serbian civilization.”  However, by 
now Montenegro and Serbia are already in de facto 
confederational relations and are learning to accept a parallel 
existence. What could not be done during the violent collapse of 
Yugoslavia, namely a “velvet divorce,” might be the ultimate 
result.  
A quick multinational intervention is the third way to 
attain independence. Obviously the only party who can provide 
security guarantees for an independent Montenegro is NATO. A 
military campaign, provoked by Milosevic’s brutal interference 
in Montenegro’s affairs, would require a massive presence of 
ground troops to deter guerrilla fighters. NATO countries, 
however, might find it difficult to attract domestic support both 
for a ground intervention, as for a new aerial strike on Serbia, 
MIEL, The Straights Time, Singapore 
Montenegro: Vassal or Sovereign? 
 
34
since Milosevic’s interference in Montenegro could be portrayed 
neither as ethnic cleansing nor as genocide. Even if a NATO led 
force should be deployed in the independence -minded republic, 
how much time would be needed until the peacekeepers could 
leave? 
Ultimately, the issue of the partition of Montenegro can 
be resurrected. The northern districts of the country are 
traditionally pro-Serbian. Moreover, several parts of today’s 
Montenegro, such as the bay of Kotor in the south and part of 
Sandjak in the north, were granted to the republic by Tito and 
were never part of Montenegro before.  
The status of an independent Montenegro and its 
political system is another unanswered question. Montenegro is 
a multinational country, less than two-thirds of its population 
describes itself as Montenegrin. One can envision the 
Macedonian scenario, with the development of a Montenegrin 
civic identity that would be embraced by other ethnic groups. It 
will take many decades, however, for a Serb to call himself a 
Montenegrin.  
Today, the symbols of Montenegrin statehood are the 
omnipresent policemen in blue uniforms and the famous urban 
complex Vector of Podgorica: built by private money it hosts 
several ministries as well as apartments for government 
employees. A retired Montenegrin minister spoke about the 
need for more uplifting national symbols and admitted that the 
local political establishment, once deprived of the figure of a 
defiant Milosevic, resembles an oligarchic regime with no 
rationale for its existence. No one, he maintained, knows who 
would assume prominence in and take the role of an opposition 
in an independent Montenegro. Promoting democracy within 
Montenegro should be a central objective whether done in 
concert with a drive for independence or acceptance of its status 
as part of the Federation. As things stand today, the elements of 
democratic politics are absent.  
The next issue in contemplating the future of Montenegro 
is economic reconstruction. The inclusion of Montenegro into the 
Stability Pact framework will provide for critical investment into 
infrastructure but a long-term strategy requires foreign 
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investment and prospects for EU membership . A fervent 
supporter of Montenegrin independence told Sofransky that 
“once we get independence we should immediately join the 
United States.” What he meant, however, was that an 
independent Montenegro will have to rely on US security and 
economic  support and was unable to function as a genuinely 
independent nation.  
After spending three weeks in Montenegro, talking to 
academics, students and politicians, Sofransky’s impression is 
that the country is indeed ready for self-governance, has a 
certain identity, political institutions and an economic system 
enabling it to function parallel to Yugoslavia. However, 
Montenegrin society would be devastated by a sudden break. It 
is not ready to openly confront the Milosevic regime nor to cope 
with internal tensions. The pragmatists in Montenegro have 
adopted the gradualist strategy towards greater sovereignty and 
this approach seems to work in this Mediterranean culture.  
Today many see Montenegro as the key for Balkan peace. 
Relieved of its Yugoslav appendix, Serbia might finally focus 
inward on the pressing economic problems and opt for 
democratization and cooperation with the international 
community. However, it might also be that Montenegro is a 
trigger for a new protracted civil war, a new Vietnam, which will 
immerse the future of Balkan people in uncertainty. The 
Montenegrins, however, do not think in purely strategic terms 
but tend to focus on a much more important, if disruptive, 
concept: their honor. With that as the focus for so many, the 
prospects for peace in the Balkans will remain clouded in the 
uncertainty of a potentially violent post-communist nationalism.  
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